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Abstract
An entrepreneur needs a lenders capital input to nance a project. The entrepreneur,
who is privately informed about the project environment, provides a labor input (e¤ort).
Capital and labor are perfect complements. We show that the entrepreneur may optimally
distort the projects capital-labor ratio. The direction of the distortion in capital-labor ratio
depends on contractibility of the entrepreneurs labor input. If the entrepreneurs labor
input is contractible, in the optimal contract, the entrepreneur may provide an excessive
amount of labor for the amount of capital funded by the lender. If, by contrast, the
entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible, part of the physical asset funded by the
lender may remain idle.
JEL Classication: D82, D86, G31
Keywords: Agency, Project Finance, Capital-Labor Ratio, Contractibility
1 Introduction
Privately held rms form the backbone of many economies and their success is seen as a
main driver of economic growth. Typically, the entrepreneurs are the main equity holders
in charge of managerial decisions for privately held rms,1 and they have to obtain outside
nancing through a debt contract to carry out their projects. In such nancial relationships,
the lenders providing funds are at an informational disadvantage because the entrepreneurs
often have private information about the project environment, such as idiosyncratic risk
of failure leading to the liquidation of the rm.2 As is well known, a privately informed
entrepreneur may push a project to a lender by exaggerating its prospects.
The entrepreneurs manipulating incentive is anticipated by the lender, and, thus, the
entrepreneur may voluntarily introduce distortions in contractual terms so as to convince
the lender that there will be no incentive problem.3 While contractual distortions in project
nancing have been extensively analyzed by previous contributions, the theoretical literature
has mainly focused on the distortions in the lenders capital input, or the size of the project.
As recent empirical studies point out, however, input choices for a rms operation are often
accompanied by misallocationof inputs.4 In other words, input compositions in a rms
operation often appear to be distorted. To do so, we develop a framework in which capital
and labor jointly determine the size of the project.
In a contractual relationship between an entrepreneur and a lender, this study provides
a rationale for why the optimal capital-labor composition in carrying out a project can be
distorted. The entrepreneur makes a contract o¤er to the lender who provides capital input
for the project. The entrepreneur provides labor input by making an e¤ort to implement
the project. Capital and labor are perfect complements. Since the entrepreneur is privately
informed on the project environment, she has an incentive to exaggerate the prospects of
the project to the lender. In addition to the manipulating incentive, a further incentive
problem may arise if the entrepreneurs e¤ort to implement the project is not veriable. In
some situations, the entrepreneurs activity is well dened and can be closely monitored. In
such cases, her e¤ort level for the project is contractible. In other situations, the contract
between the entrepreneur and the lender is subject to the entrepreneurs hidden action.
1As documented by Birtler et al. (2005) for the U.S. in the 1990s, in the majority of privately held
rms, the entrepreneur holds 100% of the equity. Furthermore, owners who are actively involved in the
management of the rm hold on average 85% of private equity.
2For empirical support, see Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002).
3See Tirole (2006, chapter 6) for a survey.
4See, for example, George (2005) and Gilchrist et al. (2013).
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To preview our results, when the entrepreneurs e¤ort for the project is veriable (and,
hence, contractible), our analysis suggests that the entrepreneur may exert more than nec-
essary e¤ort for the capital input provided by the lender.5 In other words, when the en-
trepreneurs e¤ort level (the labor input) can be closely monitored6 and contracted upon,
the projects capital-labor ratio may be distorted downwardin the optimal contract. The
intuition is as follows. In the optimal contract, the entrepreneur oversizes the project under
the favorable environment. By doing so, the entrepreneur must increase the return-payment
to the lender for his capital input, which mitigates her incentive to exaggerate the project
environment. Because the entrepreneur can contract upon her e¤ort level, committing to
exert an excessive e¤ort under the favorable project environment reduces her incentive to
exaggerate the prospects of the project. This, in turn, allows the entrepreneur to reduce
the distortion in project size. We show that the entrepreneurs excessive e¤ort takes place
in the optimal contract if the cost of e¤ort is not too large.
When, by contrast, the entrepreneurs e¤ort is not veriable (non-contractible), part of
the physical assets provided by the lender may remain idle the capital-labor ratio may be
distorted upwardin the optimal contract. That is, when the entrepreneur cannot commit
to her e¤ort level, the distortion in capital-labor ratio arises in the opposite direction.
While the project continues to be oversized in a favorable environment to mitigate the
entrepreneurs manipulating incentive, the entrepreneur now has an incentive to reduce her
costly e¤ort for the oversized project. This ex-post exibility for her e¤ort, however, makes
it easier for the entrepreneur to misrepresent the project environment. Thus, to convince
the lender that she is not exaggerating the prospects of the project, the entrepreneur may
have to increase the size of the project even further by increasing the debt (the capital
input). As a result, while all of the lenders capital input is invested in the project, part of
the physical asset may be idle in equilibrium.
While we model a simple debt contractual relationship (and, thus, the lender does not
hold equity), our analysis also sheds some light on venture capital nancing compared to
angel nancing, as our results are independent of whether the entrepreneur or the lender
is the residual claimant.7 The case in which the entrepreneurs labor is contractible can
5The entrepreneurs excessive e¤ort in our paper contrasts with conventional ndings in the literature
that the entrepreneurs e¤ort is generally ine¢ ciently low (e.g., Jensen and Meckling, 1976).
6According to Salman (1990), a venture capitalists close monitoring of the entrepreneurs implementation
include his involvement in recruiting and compensating the rms key employees, customer relationship
management, and development of rm strategies.
7This is formally shown in Section 4.2.
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be associated with venture capital nancing. A venture capitalist often requires a serious
commitment from the entrepreneur in implementing the project. As reported by Gorman
and Sahlman (1989), venture capitalists frequently visit their entrepreneurs and spend hours
for monitoring purposes. The case without the entrepreneurs commitment to her labor
input, on the other hand, can be viewed as angel nancing. Angel nancing, as pointed
out by several studies,8 relies less on commitment mechanisms often adopted in venture
capital nancing contractual relationships in angel nancing are looser and rely more on
social networks. Our results provide the testable implications that, with venture capital
nancing, a projects capital-labor ratio is more likely to be distorted downward (excessive
labor input), and with angel nancing, the opposite is true (excessive capital input).
Several previous contributions have analyzed contracting problems when entrepreneurs
are privately informed. Pioneering studies such as Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and Holm-
ström and Tirole (1997) analyze how the distribution of wealth across privately informed
entrepreneurs and uninformed lenders a¤ects contracting relationships. Ueda (2004) studies
the entrepreneurs source of funding, which determines whether her information is private
or public. Dessi (2005) studies a contractual relationship under collusion between the en-
trepreneur and monitoring intermediary.9 Our paper contributes to this line of research
by focusing on the input composition. This issue arises in contracting problems when a
complementary input has to be provided by the entrepreneur.
While the settings are di¤erent from ours, other papers also demonstrate that projects or
debt can be oversized due to private information. De Meza and Webb (1987) demonstrate
that the inability of lenders to learn entrepreneurs information results in investment in
excess of the socially e¢ cient level. Unlike ours, however, only the pooling contract can
be implemented in their model, and the authors do not consider distortions in composition
of inputs. More closely related to ours is Khalil and Parigi (1998). They show that lack
of contractibility makes the lender push the capital input beyond the e¢ cient level by
increasing the size of debt.10 In these papers, the entrepreneurs labor input does not play
a role, and thus there are no under-utilized inputs as a result of excessive provision.11
Our paper also connects with the work on entrepreneur-lender relationships under lim-
8See, for example, Wong (2002) and Fairchild (2009).
9For studies in which the lender has superior information, see Inderst (2008) and Strausz (2009).
10See also Khalil et al. (2007) for nancial contracting under common agency.
11 In a procurement context, Peitz and Shin (2013a, 2013b) show that a downstream rm may procure
supplies from an informed upstream rm in excessive quantity. Those models are markedly di¤erent from
the present one, as there is neither a commitment issue nor an informed principal problem.
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ited contractibility.12 Hart and Moore (1994) show that when a debt contract allows the
entrepreneur to walk away from providing her labor input, some protable project may not
be funded. Wang and Zhou (2004) show that dividing a project nancing into di¤erent
stages mitigates the entrepreneurs incentive to shirk on implementing the project. Wang
(2008) argues that the optimal contract with staged nancing may not be separating ac-
cording to the entrepreneurs information. We add to this strand of literature the focus on
capital-labor composition as the outcome of entrepreneur-lender relationships.
Finally, our paper is related to studies on agency theory that cope with the incentive of
the party that makes the o¤er. While the current paper is related to studies on such issues,
unlike in Maskin and Tirole (1990, 1992), we do not adopt a signaling approach in this
paper. We employ a screening approach instead, because in our model, the entrepreneur
learns her private information after her o¤er is accepted, as in Demski and Sappington
(1993), La¤ont and Martimort (2002), and Finkle (2005).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in the
following section. In Section 3, we present the optimal outcome when the entrepreneurs
labor input is contractible, followed by the optimal outcome when the labor input is non-
contractible. In Section 4, we provide further discussion and, in Section 5, we conclude. All
proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
We consider a contractual relationship between an entrepreneur (she) and a lender (he).
The entrepreneur has the initiative for the project and makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to the
lender.13 The lender provides a capital input for the project, while the entrepreneur carries
out the project by providing a labor input. The project size, denoted by Q; is determined
by the Leontief function Q = minfK, Lg; where K and L are the lenders capital input and
the entrepreneurs labor input for the project, respectively. Since providing inputs is costly,
the rst-best e¢ cient capital-labor input combination satises K = L.
The project environment is denoted by state i that can be either i = G (good) with
probability G 2 (0; 1), or i = B (bad) with probability B = 1   G. We assume that
i is neither too small nor too large such that the project size is strictly positive in either
12There is a long literature on incomplete contracting. For seminal contributions, see Grossman and Hart
(1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
13See, also, Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Neher (1999) for similar settings. As will be pointed out in
Section 4.2, it is important for our results that some bargaining power rests with the entrepreneur.
4
environment. The probability distribution i is publicly known, but, after signing the
contract, the realized project environment i 2 fG;Bg is privately observed only by the
entrepreneur.
The project environment determines the probability of success. We denote by i the
probability that the project fails, in which case the entrepreneur defaults. A good envi-
ronment has the feature that the project is less likely to fail; i.e., G < B. The lenders
cost of capital input is given by a convex cost function Ck(K) =  kK2. In case the project
succeeds, the lender receives a lump-sum payment R; in case of failure he receives zero. In
state i 2 fG;Bg, the lenders payo¤ in expectation is:
~ui = (1  i)R   kK2;
when providing K to the entrepreneur for the project. Since i is exogenous, we can divide
the expression by 1  i to transform the lenders expected payo¤ to:
ui = R  ckiK2;
where cki   
k
1 i and c
k
G < c
k
B: In what follows, we take ui as the lenders payo¤ function.
In case the project succeeds, the projects revenue is given by the function v(Q) that is
increasing and strictly concave in the project size Q with v(0) = 0; and satises the Inada
condition; in case the project fails, revenue is zero. The entrepreneurs cost of labor input is
given by C l(L) =  lL2. In state i 2 fG;Bg, the entrepreneurs payo¤ in expectation when
providing L for the project is:
~i = (1  i)(v(Q) R)   lL2:
Again, i is exogenous, so we can divide the expression by 1  i to transform the entrepre-
neurs expected payo¤ to:
i = v(Q) R  cliL2;
where cli   
l
1 i and c
l
G < c
l
B: In what follows, we take i as the entrepreneurs objective
function.
We model state i as being soft information no veriable evidence on the true state
can be obtained, and, thus, it cannot be assessed by a court. We assume that all parties
are protected by limited liabilities the contract must ensure their reservation payo¤s in
expected terms in each state i. The reservation payo¤s are normalized to zero.
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Contracting when Labor Input is Contractible
When the entrepreneurs labor input is contractible, the contract o¤ered by the entrepreneur
is contingent on her report to the lender about the project environment and species the
lenders capital input level Ki, the entrepreneurs labor input level Li, and the return
payment to the lender Ri where i 2 fG;Bg. The timing of the game under contractibility
of the labor input is:
1. The entrepreneur o¤ers a menu f(Ki; Li; Ri)i2fG;Bgg to the lender, after which the
lender decides whether to accept the contract menu.
2. If the o¤er is accepted, the entrepreneur observes the true state and announces a state
i 2 fG;Bg.
3. The lender provides the capital input Ki as specied in the contract for the announced
state.
4. The entrepreneur carries out the project by providing the labor input Li as specied
in the contract for the announced state.
5. The revenue is realized. The entrepreneur pays Ri to the lender if the project has
succeeded.
Contracting when Labor Input is Non-Contractible
When the entrepreneur cannot contract with the lender on her labor input level, the contract
o¤ered by the entrepreneur is contingent on her report to the lender about the project
environment and species the lenders capital input level Ki and the return payment to the
lender Ri where i 2 fG;Bg. The entrepreneur determines her labor input level Li after
contracting and learning state i. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. The entrepreneur o¤ers fKi; Rigi2fG;Bg to the lender, after which the lender decides
whether to accept the contract menu.
2. If the o¤er is accepted, the entrepreneur observes the true state and announces a state
i 2 fG;Bg.
3. The lender provides the capital input Ki as specied in the contract for the announced
state.
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4. The entrepreneur carries out the project by providing the labor input Li according to
her best interest.
5. The revenue is realized. The entrepreneur pays Ri to the lender if the project has
succeeded.
Capital-Labor Ratio
In characterizing input choices, we express the entrepreneurs labor input level as a function
of the lenders capital input level:
Li = riKi; where ri  0; i 2 fG;Bg:
Here, ri = Li=Ki is the inverse capital-labor ratio. For notational convenience, we let
qi = Ki and riqi = Li. Then, the project size is Qi = minfqi; riqig since:
Qi =
(
riqi when ri 2 [0; 1];
qi when ri > 1:
(1)
As rst-best e¢ ciency requires Li = Ki, a value of ri di¤erent from 1 stands for a distorted
capital-labor ratio:
ri > 1: capital-labor ratio is distorted downward (Ki=Li < 1).
ri < 1: capital-labor ratio is distorted upward (Ki=Li > 1).
The Full Information Benchmark
When the project environment i is publicly observed and veried, the e¢ cient project size
is characterized by:
v0(Qi ) = 2

cli + c
k
i

Qi ; where Q

i = q

i
and the capital-labor ratio is e¢ cient under full information: ri = L

i =K

i = 1:
3 Analysis and Results
Since the entrepreneur is privately informed of the project environment, she may have an
incentive to exaggerate the prospects of the project to the lender. As we will show, if labor
input is contractible, under some conditions, the capital-labor ratio is distorted downward.
Without such contractibility, by contrast, under some other conditions, the capital-labor
ratio is distorted upward. We rst analyze the case in which the entrepreneurs labor input
is contractible.
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3.1 Capital-Labor Ratio when Labor Input is Contractible
In light of backward induction, we present constraints that the entrepreneur faces from the
end of the time line to the beginning. As the revelation principle applies under complete
contractibility, the following incentive compatibility constraints for the entrepreneur must
be satised:
v(Qi)  cliL2i  Ri  v(Qj)  cliL2j  Rj ; i; j 2 fG;Bg: (2)
Inequalities (2) ensure that the entrepreneurs payo¤ from a truthful report on the project
environment is higher than her payo¤ from misreporting it. In addition, the entrepreneurs
o¤er must induce the lenders participation:
Ri   ckiK2i  0; i 2 fG;Bg: (3)
With Ki = qi; Li = riqi; and the expressions in (1); the incentive compatibility con-
straints in (2) and the participation constraints in (3) can be respectively rewritten as:8>><>>:
v(riqi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri  v(rjqj) + cli (rjqj)2 +Rj for ri; rj 2 [0; 1];
v(riqi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri  v(qj) + cli (rjqj)2 +Rj for ri 2 [0; 1]; rj > 1;
v(qi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri  v(qj) + cli (rjqj)2 +Rj for ri; rj > 1:
(IC)
and
Ri   cki q2i  0; (PC)
where i; j 2 fG;Bg with i 6= j and we recall that we have transformed our problem by
letting: cki  k=(1  i) and cli  l=(1  i).
The entrepreneur maximizes her expected payo¤:
X
i
i
h
v(Qi)  cliL2i  Ri
i
=
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
P
i i
h
v(riqi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri
i
g for ri 2 [0; 1];
i
h
v(riqi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri
i
+j
h
v(qj)  clj (rjqj)2  Ri
i for ri 2 [0; 1]; rj > 1;
with i 6= j;
P
i i
h
v(qi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri
i
for ri > 1;
subject to (IC) and (PC):
The following proposition compares the optimal project size and the associated capital-
labor ratio when the entrepreneurs labor input is contractible to the full-information bench-
mark.
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Proposition 1 When the entrepreneurs labor input is contractible, the optimal outcome
entails that:
 In state G, project size is inated (QcG > QG) and, in state B, it is at the same level
as under full information (QcB = Q

B).
 In state G, the capital-labor ratio is ine¢ cient and distorted downward (rcG > 1) when
the entrepreneurs labor costs are su¢ ciently small and e¢ cient otherwise. In state
B, the capital-labor ratio is e¢ cient (rcB = 1).
The entrepreneur makes the project oversized when the project environment is good. If
the entrepreneur reports about the project environment, the lender questions the validity
of the report, because the entrepreneur may have an incentive to misreport the project
environment. In particular, when the project environment is bad (true state is B), the
entrepreneur may benet by exaggerating the prospects of the project to the lender. Since
the lender anticipates such an incentive problem, the contract o¤ered by the entrepreneur
must convince the lender that the entrepreneurs report will be true. For this purpose, the
entrepreneur increases the project size in the good environment from the rst-best level
and, thereby, increases the return payment to the lender accordingly. This prevents the
entrepreneur from exaggerating the prospects of the project when the true state is B.
Note that, while the project size is distorted upward, the capital-labor ratio can be
distorted downward in state G. In our setting with perfect complements, this implies
that a fraction of the entrepreneurs labor input is wasted when implementing the project
in the good environment. In other words, the entrepreneurs e¤ort level is higher than
technologically required to reach project size Q determined by the lenders input level.
Recall that the entrepreneur may have an incentive to misrepresent the project environment.
It is costly for the entrepreneur to provide the labor input to implement the project and,
therefore, committing to exert more than the required e¤ort to reach Q in the announced
good environment discourages the entrepreneur from claiming that the project environment
is good when it is bad. It is optimal for the entrepreneur to distort the capital-labor ratio
by making an excessive e¤ort when the entrepreneurs labor costs are su¢ ciently small. To
see this, consider the binding incentive constraint for i = B:
B = v(qG)  clB (rGqG)2   ckGq2G; (4)
where qG = QG. Absent a distortion of the capital-labor ratio, the project size QG would
need to be heavily oversized to be incentive compatible. Making an excessive e¤ort in the
9
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Figure 1: Capital-labor ratio and project size when the entrepreneurs labor input is con-
tractible
favorable environment (rG > 1) allows the entrepreneur to reduce the distortion in qG;
which is optimal when doing so is not very costly (clG is small).
14
Numerical Example: Suppose that v(Qi) = 1000 ln(qi + 1), G = 0:4 () B = 0:6),
ckG = 1, c
k
B = 5, c
l
G = 0:2, and c
l
B = 1 (thus the underlying parameters are  
k = 0:8,
 l = 0:2, G = 0:2, and B = 0:4. The rst-best outcome then is: r

G = r

B = 1; Q

G = 19:91;
QB = 8:64, and rst-best prots are E [

i ] = G

G+B

B = 0:42564:54+0:61818:02 =
2116:63: When the entrepreneur is privately informed about the project environment, the
optimal contract features a downward distortion of the capital-labor ratio for i = G (rcG =
1:32 > 1 and rcB = 1): The optimal input levels and the project sizes then are:
QcG = q
c
G = 21:86 and r
c
Gq
c
G = 28:85;
QcB = Q

B = 8:64;
E [i] = GG + B

B = 0:4 2484:83 + 0:6 1818:02 = 2084:75:
If the entrepreneur could not distort the capital-labor ratio (rG = 1), then QG = 27:8 and
her expected payo¤ would be 2064 (< 2084:75).
14 In terms of the underlying parameters in the model, this means that the project is unlikely to fail in the
good state; i.e., G is small.
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To illustrate the two regimes, it is useful to plot the optimal outcome as a function of
the virtual cost of labor input in the good state, clG.
15 Figure 1 does so in the case when
the labor input is contractible. Notice from Figure 1 that rcG and Q
c
G have two regimes
(rcG > 1 and r
c
G = 1), and in each regime they are independent of the entrepreneurs virtual
cost of labor clG: When c
l
G is small enough, the optimal capital input q
c
G (i.e., the optimal
project size QcG since QG = qG for rG > 1) and the optimal inverse capital-labor ratio r
c
G
are characterized by (see proof of Proposition 1 in Appendix A):
v0(qcG)  2ckGqcG = 0 and rcG =
s
v(qcG)  ckG(qcG)2   B
clB(q
c
G)
2
:
The reason that in each regime rG and QG are independent of clG is that these variables
are determined taking the entrepreneurs misreporting incentive into account before she
announces the state, when the true state is B.16
3.2 Capital-Labor Ratio when Labor Input is Non-contractible
We now proceed to the case in which the entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible.
Because the entrepreneur has no incentive to understate the project environment as B
when the true state is G, the equilibrium outcome for i = B is again the rst best and
the same as the one under contractibility of the labor input: QB = QB and rB = 1. For
convenience, we again use the following notation for the rst-best surplus in the state i = B:
B  v(QB)  (clB + ckB)Q2B :
Since QB = QB and rB = 1; we can focus on the variables for i = G. The contract
o¤ered to the lender species the capital input level provided by the lender, qi = Ki, and
the return payment, Ri, to him. The entrepreneur chooses the capital-labor ratio that
determines her labor input level (LG = rGqG) according to her best interest at the point of
carrying out the project. That is, ri is chosen to maximize the entrepreneurs payo¤ after
the capital input Ki = qi has been committed.
Note that, since the entrepreneur cannot commit to her labor input level, she will
optimally choose LG  KG. Therefore, using the expression in (1), we obtain the following
lemma.
15Alternatively, we could plot the optimal outcome as a function of one of the underlying parameters.
However, for the purpose of interpretation, the present comparative statics are more helpful.
16As will be discussed below, when the entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible, the optimal rG and
QG is not independent on clG in the regime where the capital-labor ratio is distorted.
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Lemma 1 When labor input is non-contractible, rG  1 in equilibrium.
The lemma implies that, in equilibrium,
QG = minfrGqG; qGg = rGqG;
Therefore, in contrast to the case in which the entrepreneurs e¤ort is contractible, a down-
ward distortion in the capital-labor ratio (rG > 1) cannot occur in the optimal contract.
Even though the entrepreneurs choices are not fully contractible, the revelation principle
holds, and thus the optimal contract always induces the entrepreneurs truthful report. The
reason is that only the entrepreneur learns the state and has an action,17 and therefore no
relevant beliefs are a¤ected under limited commitment in Appendix B, we show that it is
optimal for the entrepreneur to report truthfully.
Under limited commitment, the contract o¤ered by the entrepreneur must respect the
later choices of the entrepreneur. Because rG, which represents the entrepreneurs labor
input level under truth-telling, may be di¤erent from the one under misrepresenting the
state, we denote by rBG the entrepreneurs labor input ratio (given capital input) when she
claims that i = G while the true state is B. Then, rG and rBG must satisfy:
rG 2 argmaxbrG v(brGqG)  clG (brGqG)2 with rG  1; (EXG)
rBG 2 argmaxbrBG v(brBGqG)  clB(brBGqG)2 with rBG  1; (EXBG )
where rBG  1 is implied by rG  1; if rG as the maximizer of v(rGqG) clG (rGqG)2 is less than
one, then the same must be true for rBG as the maximizer of v(r
B
GqG)  clB(rBGqG)2. These
conditions represent the entrepreneurs choice of labor input according to her objectives
after announcing that the project environment is good: (EXG) represents her choice of
labor input in the case of truth-telling, and (EXBG ) represents her choice in the case of
misreporting. The entrepreneurs o¤er in equilibrium must satisfy all these constraints.
Recall that the optimal outcome associated with the bad environment is the rst best
with the payo¤: B  v(QB)   (clB + ckB)Q2B . When the labor input is non-contractible,
the entrepreneur maximizes her expected payo¤:
E [i] = G[v(rGqG)  clG (rGqG)2  RG] + BB,
subject to
B  v(rBGqG)  clB(rBGqG)2  RG; (ICnB)
17Since the capital input is contracted, the lender does not take any action after accepting the contract.
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RG   ckGq2G  0; (PCnG)
where rG and rBG are given by (EXG) and (EX
B
G ):
The following proposition provides results on the optimal project size and the associated
capital-labor ratio when the entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible.
Proposition 2 When the entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible, the capital input
in equilibrium is larger than when it is contractible (qnG > q
c
G). The optimal outcome entails
that:
 In state G, project size is inated (QnG > QG) and, in state B, it is at the same level
as under full information (QnB = Q

B).
 In state G, the capital-labor ratio is ine¢ cient and distorted upward (rnG < 1) when
the entrepreneurs labor costs are su¢ ciently large and e¢ cient otherwise. In state
B, the capital-labor ratio is e¢ cient (rnB = 1).
As in the case in which the entrepreneurs labor input is contractible, the project is
oversized in state G to discourage the entrepreneur from exaggerating the prospects of the
project. However, because her labor input is not contractible, the entrepreneur can save
on her labor cost ex post for the oversized project by leaving a proportion of the capital
input provided by the lender idle. This possibility makes it less costly for the entrepreneur
to misrepresent a bad project environment at the announcement stage.
The entrepreneurs ex post shirking incentive, however, is anticipated by the lender.
Therefore, to convince the lender to accept the entrepreneurs o¤er, the capital input (as
the contractible variable) needs to be increased compared to the case of contractibility.
The increased capital input, while convincing the lender that the entrepreneur will not
misrepresent the project environment, exacerbates the entrepreneurs ex post incentive to
under-provide e¤ort. As a result, when the entrepreneurs labor costs are large, the capital-
labor ratio for the project is distorted upward since the entrepreneur does not utilize the
entire physical asset nanced by the lender.
In summary, when her labor input is contractible, the entrepreneur may have to work
excessively, resulting in an downward distortion in the capital-labor ratio. By contrast,
when the labor input cannot be contracted upon, the entrepreneur will borrow more than
necessary, resulting in an upward distortion in the capital-labor ratio.
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Figure 2: Capital-labor ratio and project size when the entrepreneurs labor input is non-
contractible
Numerical Example: Consider the same parameters for the entrepreneurs value func-
tion, as well as G = 0:4 () B = 0:6). Suppose now that ckG = 1:8, ckB = 2, clG = 9, and
clB = 10 (thus the underlying parameters are  
k = 0:8,  l = 4, G = 0:55, and B = 0:6).
The rst-best outcome then is: rG = r

B = 1; Q

G = 6:32; Q

B = 5:97, and rst-best prots
are E [i ] = G

G + B

B = 0:4  1559:23 + 0:6  1513:92 = 1532:05. When the entre-
preneur is privately informed about the project environment i 2 fG;Bg, in the optimal
contract the capital-labor ratio is distorted upward for i = G (rnG = 0:98 < 1 and r
n
B = 1).
The optimal input levels and the project sizes then are:
QnG = r
n
Gq
n
G = 6:92 (where q
n
G = 7:13),
QnB = Q

B = 5:97
E [i] = GG + B

B = 0:4 1546:91 + 0:6 1513:92 = 1527:12:
If the entrepreneur could contract upon her labor input, in the optimal contract, rG = 1 and
QG = 6:51 (< 7:13). Hence, in this example, the entrepreneur optimal would not distort
the capital-labor ratio if the labor input were contractible. Her expected payo¤ would then
be E [i] = 1531:77 (> 1527:12).
Figure 2 illustrates the optimal outcome as a function of clG when the entrepreneurs
labor input is non-contractible. Recall that, when labor input is contractible, neither rcG
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nor QcG varies according to the entrepreneurs virtual cost of labor c
l
G within any regime
(rcG > 1 or r
c
G = 1) see Figure 1. The reason was that r
c
G and Q
c
G are determined by taking
the entrepreneurs misreporting incentive into account before she announces the state, when
the true state is B. By contrast, when the labor input is non-contractible, both rnG and
QnG vary with c
l
G in the regime of r
n
G < 1. Unlike when the labor input is contractible, rG
is chosen after the entrepreneur truthfully reported that the state is G. Since QG = rGqG
under non-contractibility, the optimal project size QnG is also a¤ected by c
l
G.
4 Discussion and Extensions
4.1 Mandatory Monitoring of the Labor Input
Several implications of our results are worth further discussion. Since the capital-labor
ratio may be optimally distorted and thus valuable inputs may be wasted, a possible policy
recommendation is to make monitoring the entrepreneurs e¤ort mandatory. In view of
our framework, this means that prior to such a policy intervention labor input is non-
contractible and becomes contractible thereafter. According to our result, as a general
rule, such a policy is problematic if the objective is to restore the e¢ cient capital-labor
ratio. Recall that when the entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible, part of the
physical assets may remain idle the entrepreneurs low labor input level relative to the
lenders capital input level distorts capital-labor ratio upwards. At rst glance, one may
suggest that mandatory monitoring may solve the problem. When the entrepreneurs labor
input is observed and, thus, contractible, however, distortion in capital-labor ratio may be
changed to the opposite direction. As we have shown, given the capital input level, the
entrepreneur may exert more e¤ort than required to implement the project in its full size
i.e., a downward distortion of the capital-labor ratio may be the consequence of mandatory
monitoring.
For illustration, we revisit our numerical examples in Section 3.1, the case in which the
entrepreneurs e¤ort is contractible: v(Qi) = 1000 ln(qi+1); G = 0:4 ()B = 0:6); ckG = 1;
ckB = 5; c
l
G = 0:2 and c
l
B = 1:We have r
c
G = 1:32 at the optimum. In our model, this means
that 0:32qcG of the labor input is not needed for the project size in state G. For the same
clG and c
l
B; if the entrepreneurs e¤ort is not contractible, then r
n
G = 1. Thus, mandatory
monitoring of labor input introduces a distortion of the capital-labor ratio.
When the entrepreneurs cost of labor input is large, by contrast, the requirement that
the lender monitors the entrepreneurs e¤ort may remove the distortion in capital-labor
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ratio (and improve the projects outcome). From the example in Section 3.2 with the same
parameters as before but ckG = 1:8; c
k
B = 2; c
l
G = 9, and c
l
B = 10, when the entrepreneurs
e¤ort is non-contractible, we have rnG = 0:98 at the optimum. That is, 0:02q
n
G of the capital
input remains idle. If the entrepreneurs e¤ort is contractible, then rG = 1 for the same
parameters. Hence, mandatory monitoring is a mixed blessing if policy is aimed at removing
distortions of the capital-labor ratio.
However, the policy objective of removing distortions in capital-labor ratio can be ques-
tioned. Despite the possible distortion of the capitol-labor ratio under contractibility, mak-
ing the entrepreneurs labor input contractible by monitoring the entrepreneurs e¤ort al-
ways Pareto-dominates the outcome in the entrepreneur-lender relationship.18 Hence, based
on joint surplus, the outcome under contractibility is always superior and, thus, mandatory
monitoring should be chosen if not too costly. As long as monitoring costs are su¢ ciently
low and funding for the monitoring activity can be arranged e¢ ciently, contractibility of
the labor input would be privately arranged in the entrepreneur-lender relationship. Thus,
any justication of a policy intervention has to rely on a wedge between private and so-
cial benets arising from a¤ected third parties, which is not present in our model, or the
inability to allocate the monitoring costs e¢ ciently between both parties.
4.2 Robustness
We also shortly elaborate on four modications. First, we reverse the bargaining power.
Following previous contributions, such as Holmström and Tirole (1997) and Neher (1999),
we assumed that the entrepreneur takes the initiative, and, therefore, is the one who designs
and o¤ers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the lender. If the bargaining power shifts to the
lender i.e., the lender o¤ers the contract to the privately informed entrepreneur then the
optimal outcome in such case is not sensitive to the contractibility of the entrepreneurs
labor input.19 In addition, although the project will be under-sized (instead of over-sized)
in such a case, there will be no distortion of the capital-labor ratio. The reason is as follows.
The lenders contract o¤er maximizes his expected payo¤,
P
i i

Ri   cki q2i

; subject to the
18To illustrate this result, we return to the two examples. In the rst of the two examples from above, the
entrepreneurs payo¤ is E[i] = 2084:75 under contractibility, and E[i] = 2064 under non-contractibility.
In the second of the two examples, the entrepreneurs payo¤ is E[i] = 1527:12 under non-contractibility,
and E[i] = 1531:77 under contractibility. The lenders rent is zero in either case.
19For studies assuming that the lender o¤ers the contract to the entrepreneur, see Wang and Zhou (2004)
and Kaplan and Stromberg (2001).
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following incentive compatibility and participation constraints for the entrepreneur:
v(Qi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri  v(Qj)  cli (rjqj)2  Rj ;
v(Qi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri  0;
where Qi = minfqi; riqig and i; j 2 fG;Bg with i 6= j. Notice rst that ri does not enter
the lenders objective function, and, therefore, the optimal Qi and Ri for the lender will
be the same with or without the contractibility of ri (which represents the entrepreneurs
e¤ort level). Also, the entrepreneurs manipulating incentive changes its direction. When
the contract is o¤ered by the lender, the entrepreneur has an incentive to understate the
projects prospects so that she can pocketthe revenue as much as possible unlike in the
case where the entrepreneur makes the o¤er, she has an incentive to understate the project
environment. Therefore, as in the standard screening problem, the project becomes under-
sized when the environment is unfavorable, QB < QB. If rB < 1 (i.e., LB < KB), the lender
could always gain by decreasing his capital input level. If rB > 1 (i.e., LB > KB), the lender
would simply give up extra rent to the entrepreneur. Hence, we must have rB = 1. To
summarize, distortions of the capital-labor ratio can only occur if the entrepreneur makes
the contract o¤er with positive probability.
Second, we make the lender, instead of the entrepreneur, the residual claimant. Our
result is robust to which party is the residual claimant, as long as the entrepreneur o¤ers the
contract. To see this, suppose that the entrepreneur o¤ers the contract, but the lender takes
v(Qi) and pays Ri to the entrepreneur. In such case, the entrepreneurs contract o¤er max-
imizes her expected payo¤:
P
i i
h
Ri   cli (riqi)2
i
; subject to the incentive compatibility
condition for herself,
Ri   cli (riqi)2  Rj   cli (rjqj)2 ;
and the participation constraint for the lender,
v(Qi)  cki q2i  Ri  0;
where Qi = minfqi; riqig and i; j 2 fG;Bg: Since the participation constraints for the
lender are binding in the optimal contract, we must have Ri = v(Qi)   cki q2i . Substituting
for Ri in the objective function and the incentive compatibility constraint, the problem
becomes the same as our original problem.
Third, we implicitly assumed that the entrepreneur cannot use invested capital for alter-
native internal or external use. If, by contrast, this is the case, our mechanism still applies
as long as the this internal or external alternative use is su¢ ciently unattractive. Then, in
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the environment in which the entrepreneurs labor input is non-contractible, the distortion
of the capital-labor ratio can be further exacerbated.
Fourth, we assumed that capital and entrepreneurial e¤ort are perfect complements.
This led to a tractable framework with the specic feature that in the optimal contract a
fraction of one of the two inputs is wasted. If some substitution is possible between the two
factors, we will no longer observe that some units of input remain idle; however, as long as
the two factors are not perfect substitutes, the same forces as in our model are at work such
that, under some conditions, the optimal input allocation for the project is accompanied by
a distorted capital-labor ratio.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated the optimal capital-labor ratio of a project when the
entrepreneur who needs to nance the project is privately informed about the project en-
vironment. The entrepreneur obtains the capital input for the project through a debt
contract with a lender, and provides her labor input to implement the project. We ana-
lyzed whether and why the capital-labor ratio in the optimal contract can be distorted. Our
result suggests that the capital-labor ratio may be distorted in either direction, depending
on the contractibility of the entrepreneurs e¤ort. Due to her private information about the
project environment, the entrepreneur must make the project oversized when contracting
with the lender. If the labor input is contractible, the entrepreneur may optimally exert
an excessive e¤ort under a good project environment. This pushes the capital-labor ratio
down below the e¢ cient level. If the entrepreneurs labor input is not contractible, the
capital input under a good environment is further increased, while the use of labor relative
to capital may be optimally reduced by the entrepreneur. This gives rise to an excessive
capital-labor ratio.
Our results suggest that private information possessed by entrepreneurs is an important
determinant of capital-labor ratios in industries with privately held rms. Whether these
ratios lie above or below what would be observed under full information depends on the
contracting environment. The observed di¤erences of capital-labor ratios across industries
and time may therefore reect not only di¤erences in technology, but also di¤erences with
respect to the contractibility of the complementary labor input.
18
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Notice from (IC) that there are four possible cases: (i) rG; rB 2 [0; 1]; (ii) rG; rB > 1; (iii)
rG 2 [0; 1] and rB > 1; and (iv) rG > 1 and rB 2 [0; 1]. As will become clear, however,
by allowing the corner solutions in case (ii); (iii) and (iv); i.e., rG  1 and rB  1; it is
su¢ cient to check cases (i) and (ii): Below we rst consider case (i) where ri; rj 2 [0; 1] to
show that rG = 1 with QG > QG and rB = 1 with QB = Q

B (the outcome associated with
state B is the rst best). Since the outcome associated with state G is distorted, we then
proceed to case (ii) by allowing the corner solution in the ratio, ri; rj  1 to check if the
ratios from case (i) is indeed the optimal solution.
Case (i) rG; rB 2 [0; 1]: The Lagrangian of the entrepreneurs problem is as follows:
L =
X
i
i
h
v(riqi)  cli (riqi)2  Ri
i
+1
h
RG   ckGq2G
i
+ 2
h
RB   ckBq2B
i
+3
h
v(rGqG)  clG (rGqG)2  RG   v(rBqB) + clG (rBqB)2 +RB
i
+4
h
v(rBqB)  clB (rBqB)2  RB   v(rGqG) + clB (rGqG)2 +RG
i
, with 1  ri  0:
First-order conditions of maximizing the Lagrangian are
@L
@RG
=  G + 1   3 + 4 = 0; (A1)
@L
@RB
=  B + 2 + 3   4 = 0; (A2)
@L
@qG
= G
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clGr2GqG
i
  21ckGqG (A3)
+ 3
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clGr2GqG
i
  4
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clBr2GqG
i
= 0;
@L
@qB
= B
h
rBv
0(rBqB)  2clBr2BqB
i
  22ckBqB (A4)
  3
h
rBv
0(rBqB)  2clGr2BqB
i
+ 4
h
rBv
0(rBqB)  2clBr2BqB
i
= 0;
From (A1), G + 3 = 1 + 4: Therefore, (A3) gives:
(1 + 4) [rGv
0(rGqG)  2clGr2GqG]  21ckGqG   4
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clBr2GqG
i
= 0:
The equation, after a simple rearrangement becomes:
1
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2(clGr2G + ckG)qG
i
= 24

clG   clB

r2GqG: (A5)
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In (A5); if 1 = 0 then it must be that 4 = 0: Then, (A1) gives G =  3 and we have a
contradiction. Therefore, 1 > 0 and thus RG = ckGq
2
G:
From (A2), B + 4 = 2 + 3: Therefore, (A4) gives:
(2 + 3) [rBv
0(rBqB)  2clBr2BqB]  22ckBqB   3
h
rBv
0(rBqB)  2clGr2BqB
i
= 0:
The equation, after a simple rearrangement becomes:
2
h
rBv
0(rBqB)  2(clBr2B + ckB)qB
i
= 23

clB   clG

r2BqB: (A6)
In (A6); if 2 = 0 then it must be that 3 = 0: Then, (A1) gives B =  4 and we have a
contradiction. Therefore, 2 > 0 and thus RB = ckBq
2
B:
We now show that 3 = 0: Suppose that 3 > 0: Then, since 2 > 0; (A6) implies
that rBv0(rBqB)   2(clBr2B + ckB)qB > 0. This implies that the project size is dostorted
downward: QB < QB: For rB 2 [0; 1]; however, the entrepreneur can always increase qB
by an arbitrary small amount to increase her expected payo¤. Thus, it must be that 3 = 0
in the optimum.
Since RG = ckGq
2
G, RB = c
k
Bq
2
B and 3 = 0; we can rewrite the Lagrangian as:
L =
X
i
i
h
v(riqi)  cli (riqi)2   cki q2i
i
+4
h
v(rBqB)  clB (rBqB)2   ckBq2B   v(rGqG) + clB (rGqG)2 + ckGq2G
i
,
with 1  ri  0: First-order conditions are:
@L
@qG
= G
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2(clGr2G + ckG)qG
i
(A7)
 4
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2(clBr2G + ckG)qG
i
= 0,
@L
@qB
= (B + 4)
h
rBv
0(rBqB)  2(clBr2B + ckB)qB
i
= 0 (A8)
From (A8), we have rBv0(rBqB)  2(clBr2B + ckB)qB = 0 implying that:
rB
h
v0(rBqB)  2clBrBqB
i
= 2ckBqB > 0: (A9)
Di¤erentiating with respect to rB gives:
@L
@rB
= (B + 4)
h
v0(rBqB)  2clBrBqB
i
qB > 0;
since v0(rBqB) 2clBrBqB > 0 from (A9): Therefore, rB = 1, and (A8) implies that qB = QB:
Consequently, the optimal outcome for i = B is the rst best.
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From (A7); we have:
G
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2(clGr2G + ckG)qG
i
= 4
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2(clBr2G + ckG)qG
i
; (A10)
and on the left-hand side of (A10); rGv0(rGqG)  2(clGr2G+ ckG)qG < 0 from (A5): Therefore,
the right-hand side of (A10) must be negative, and, since rGv0(rGqG)  2(clBr2G + ckG)qG <
rGv
0(rGqG)  2(clGr2G + ckG)qG < 0, it must be that 4 > 0 and G > 4: Also, from (A10);
we have:n
G
h
v0(rGqG)  2clGrGqG
i
  4
h
v0(rGqG)  2clBrGqG
io
rG = 2(G 4)ckGqG > 0: (A11)
Di¤erentiating the Lagrangian with respect to rG gives:
@L
@rG
=
n
G
h
v0(rGqG)  2clGrGqG
i
  4
h
v0(rGqG)  2clBrGqG
io
qG > 0;
where the strict inequality is implied by (A11). Therefore, rG = 1 and since rGv0(rGqG) 
2(clGr
2
G + c
k
G)qG < 0, we have qG = QG > Q

G.
Case (ii) rG; rB  1: Recall that the solution for i = B in case (i) where ri; rj 2 [0; 1]
is the rst best. It can be shown in a similar way that the solution for i = B in the case of
rB  1 is the rst-best: rB = 1 and qB = QB (since the rst-order condition with respect to
rB is strictly negative, implying that rB = 1). For convenience, we dene the entrepreneurs
rst-best payo¤ in the state i = B:
B  v(QB)  (clB + ckB)Q2B :
Regarding rG, if we have the corner solution in the case of ri  1, the optimal outcome is
the one that we obtained for the case of 1  ri  0: If we have an interior solution here,
then rG = 1 for the case of 1  ri  0 cannot be optimal.
Thus, the Lagrangian of the entrepreneurs problem for ri  1 is:
L = G
h
v(qG)  clG (rGqG)2  RG
i
+ B

B
+5
h
RG   ckGq2G
i
+6
h
B   v(qG) + clB (rGqG)2 +RG
i
, with rG  1:
Di¤erentiating with respect to RG and qG gives respectively:
@L
@RG
=  G + 5 + 6 = 0; (A12)
@L
@qG
= G
h
v0(qG)  2clGr2GqG
i
  25ckGqG   6
h
v0(qG)  2clBr2GqG
i
= 0: (A13)
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From (A12), we have G = 5 + 6 and, therefore, (A13) can be rewritten as:
5
h
v0(qG)  2(clGr2G + ckG)qG
i
= 26
h
clG   clB
i
r2GqG: (A14)
In (A14); if 5 = 0 then it must be that 6 = 0; which leads to a contradiction since
5 + 6 = G > 0 from (A12): Therefore 5 > 0; and thus RG = c
k
Gq
2
G: If we have the
corner solution, rG = 1; then the optimal outcome is the solution that we obtained in the
case of ri 2 [0; 1]; and (A5) with rG = 1 gives v0(qG)   2(clG + ckG)qG < 0. This means,
in (A14), that 5 > 0 implies that 6 > 0; if we have the corner solution. If we have an
interior solution, rG > 1, then we still have rGv0(rGqG)   2(clGr2G + ckG)qG < 0; and hence
in (A14) 5 > 0 implies that 6 > 0: Since 5 > 0 and 6 > 0, it is implied that G > 6
from G = 5 + 6 in (A12).
Since RG = ckGq
2
G, we can rewrite the Lagrangian as:
L = G
h
v(qG)  clG (rGqG)2   ckGq2G
i
+ B

B
+6
h
B   v(qG) + clB (rGqG)2 + ckGq2G
i
, with rG  1:
The rst-order condition with respect to qG is:
@L
@qG
= G
h
v0(qG)  2

clGr
2
G + c
k
G

qG
i
  6
h
v0(qG)  2

clBr
2
G + c
k
G

qG
i
= 0:
Rearranging this equation we have:
2
h
Gc
l
G   6clB
i
r2GqG = (G   6)
h
v0(qG)  2ckGqG
i
: (A15)
Note that G > 6 as shown above. Di¤erentiating with respect to rG gives:
@L
@rG
= 2

6c
l
B   GclG

rGq
2
G: (A16)
To have an interior solution for rG (i.e., @L=@rG = 0), (A16) requires that:
6 =
Gc
l
G
clB
; (A17)
and if (A17) holds, then the left-hand side of (A15) is zero. Then from the right-hand side
of (A15); it must be that:
v0(qG)  2ckGqG = 0; (A18)
and qG is characterized by (A18): Since 6 > 0; the associated binding constraint gives:
rG =
s
v(qG)  ckGq2G   B
clBq
2
G
: (A19)
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If rG = 1, then qG = QG; and (A19) gives: B   v(QG) + clBQ2G+ ckGQ2G = 0: This equation
implies that the optimal project size is always distorted upward and independent of clG. If
rG > 1 (i.e., it is an interior solution), from the expression in (A17), 6 is decreasing in clG,
implying that the distortion of project size is smaller than if the entrepreneur were forced
to set rG = 1. Therefore, for clG small enough, the entrepreneurs e¤ort is distorted and rG
has an interior solution, which is independent of clG, as follows from (A19).
Case (iii) rG 2 [0; 1]; rB  1 and Case (iv) rG  1; rB 2 [0; 1]: In both cases, as in
the previous cases, the solution for i = B is the rst best: rB = 1 and qB = QB. Since we
always have rB = 1 it is then su¢ cient to consider cases (i) and (ii). 
Proof of Lemma 1.
Suppose, by contradiction, that ri > 1 is optimal when chosen ex post. For ri  1, the
entrepreneurs problem with respect to ri is maxri v(qi)   cli(riqi)2; i 2 fG;Bg: It is clear
from the problem that the entrepreneur will set ri as small as possible, implying that the
optimal ri cannot be larger than 1. 
Proof of Proposition 2.
The Lagrangian of the entrepreneurs problem is:
L = G[v(rGqG)  clG (rGqG)2  RG] + BB
+7
h
RG   ckGq2G
i
+8
h
B   v(rBGqG) + clB
 
rBGqG
2
+RG
i
; with (EXG) and (EXBG ):
First-order conditions are:
@L
@RG
=  G + 7 + 8 = 0; (A21)
@L
@qG
= G
h
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clGr2GqG
i
  27ckGqG (A22)
 8
h
rBGv
0(rBGqG)  2clB
 
rBG
2
qG
i
= 0:
Suppose that 7 > 0: Then, (A21) implies that G > 8: Also, since 7 = G   8 from
(A21), we can rewrite (A22) as:
G[rGv
0(rGqG)  2

clGr
2
G + c
k
G

qG] = 8[r
B
Gv
0(rBGqG)  2(clB
 
rBG
2
+ ckG)qG]: (A23)
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Since G > 8, (A23) implies that:
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clGr2GqG < rBGv0(rBGqG)  clB
 
rBG
2
qG: (A24)
From (EXG) and (EXBG ), rG  rBG . If rG = 1 and rBG < 1, then (EXG) and (EXBG ) imply
that the left-hand side of (A24) is strictly positive and the right-hand side of (A24) is zero.
This contradicts the inequality in (A24). If rG = rBG = 1; then we have v
0(qG)   2clGqG <
v0(qG)  2clBqG from (A24), which is a contradiction. If rG < 1 and rBG < 1; then both sides
of (A20) are zero, which contradicts the inequality. Thus, it must be that 7 = 0; which
implies that 8 = G(> 0) from (A21):
With 7 = 0 and 8 = G, the equation in (A22) becomes:
rGv
0(rGqG)  2clGr2GqG = rBGv0(rBGqG)  2clB
 
rBG
2
qG:
Again from (EXG) and (EXBG ), rG  rBG . If rG = rBG = 1, then we have a contradiction in
the above equation since v0(qG)   2clGqG > v0(qG)   2clBqG. There are two possible cases:
rG = 1 and rBG < 1, and rG < 1 and r
B
G < 1. That is, it must then hold that r
B
G < 1 in any
case. Since 8 > 0; it is implied that: B = v(r
B
GqG)  clB
 
rBGqG
2  RG: There is a leeway
in this equation since 7 = 0, i.e., RG   ckGq2G  0 is automatically satised. One way is to
set RG = ckGq
2
G to have:
B = v(r
B
GqG)  clB
 
rBGqG
2   ckGq2G: (A21)
The value of qG and rBG are determined by solving (A21) and (EX
B
G ) simultaneously. Since
rBG < 1, equation (A21) implies that the level of qG is distorted upward even further com-
pared to the level when the entrepreneurs e¤ort is contractible, i.e., qnG > q
c
G. Finally, with
the values of qG and rBG determined, rG is computed from (EXG), which implies that, for
clG large enough, rG < 1. 
Appendix B: Optimality of Truthful Reporting When the La-
bor Input is Non-contractible
We denote by  the probability that the entrepreneur makes a truthful report when the
true state is i = B; and by  the probability that the lender accepts the entrepreneurs
o¤er. We show that  =  = 1 in equilibrium.
Under limited commitment, the contract o¤ered by the entrepreneur must respect the
later choices of the entrepreneur and the lender according to each partys objective functions
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at the corresponding stages. Because rG, which represents the entrepreneurs labor input
level under truth-telling, may be di¤erent from the one under misrepresenting the state, we
let rBG represent the entrepreneurs labor input level when she claims that i = G when the
true state is B. In equilibrium, ; ; rG and rBG , must satisfy:
 2 argmaxb bB + (1  b) hv(rBGqG)  clB  rBGqG2  RGi ; (B1)
 2 argmaxb b
n
G
h
RG   ckGq2G
i
+ B(1  )
h
RG   ckBq2G
io
; (B2)
rG 2 argmaxbrG v(brGqG)  clG(brGqG)2 with rG  1; (B3)
rBG 2 argmaxbrBG v(brBGqG)  clB(brBGqG)2 with rBG  1; (B4)
where rBG  1 is implied by rG  1 (Lemma 1): The rst constraint, (B1), represents
the entrepreneurs choice regarding truth-telling versus misreporting after learning that the
true state is B. The second constraint, (B2), represents the lenders choice of accepting
or rejecting the o¤er. Notice from (B2) that, when the entrepreneur claims that the state
is G, there are two possibilities from the lenders point of view: The report is true with
probability G, and the report is false with B(1 ). With probability B, the outcome
is rst best, and the lenders rent is zero. The last two constraints, (B3) and (B4), represent
the entrepreneurs choice of labor input level according to her objectives after announcing
that the project environment is good; (B3) represents her choice of labor input in the case of
truth-telling, and (B4) represents her choice in the case of misreporting. The entrepreneurs
o¤er in equilibrium must satisfy all these constraints.
There are three candidates for an outcome. First, the entrepreneur induces herself to
truthfully report the project environment to the lender when the true state is B, and the
lender rationally anticipates that the report will be truthful and accepts the o¤er ( = 1 and
 = 1). Second, the entrepreneur induces herself to exaggerate the prospects of the project
when the true state is i = B, and the lender anticipates this and rejects the o¤er ( = 0
and  = 0). Finally, the entrepreneur induces herself to randomize between reporting the
truth and misrepresenting the state when the true state is i = B, and anticipating this, the
lender randomizes between accepting and rejecting. Then, both, entrepreneur and lender,
may use mixed strategies (1 >  > 0; and 1 >  > 0). We show that the contract that
induces  = 1 and  = 1 dominates those that induce  = 0 and  = 0, or 1 >  > 0; and
1 >  > 0.
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We dene:

  B  
h
v(rBGqG)  clB(rBGqG)2  RG
i
;
where B  v(QB)  (clB + ckB)Q2B : Then, the entrepreneurs decision regarding a truthful
report follows the rule:
 2
8>><>>:
f0g if 
 < 0;
f1g if 
 > 0;
(0; 1) if 
 = 0:
For 
 < 0, the optimal contract with  = 0 will induce the lenders participation only
when the true state is G with the rst-best production levels: qG = qG and, thus, rG = 1:
This case prevails when B is very small. We rule this case out because, as mentioned in
the model section, we are focusing on the situation in which i is not too small that the
entrepreneur wants to realize the project in either state.
For 
 > 0,  = 1, and thus the participation constraint for the lender when i = G;
RG  ckGq2G  0, implies that  = 1: Then, the entrepreneurs incentive constraint becomes:
B  v(rBGqG)  clB(rBGqG)2  RG: (B5)
The inequalities are weak since these constraints may be binding. The strictness of 
 > 0
follows from the usual argument in a model of this type that, by choosing the level of qG
slightly higher than the level that satises (B5) with equality, the entrepreneur strictly
prefers to truthfully report that the state is B. This means that qG = eqG + ; where eqG
satises (B5) with equality, and qG approaches eqG in the limit as  ! 0. We restrict
attention to the case that (B5) is binding, and show in the proof of Proposition 2 that (B5)
must be binding. Then, the entrepreneur solves:
max
qG;rG
G[v(rGqG)  clG(rGqG)2  RG] + BB;
subject to
RG   ckGq2G  0;
B = v(r
B
GqG)  clB(rBGqG)2  RG;
(B3); and (B4):
For 
 = 0; the entrepreneurs objective function is:

n
G[v(rGqG)  clG(rGqG)2  RG] + B[B + (1  )(v(rBGqG)  clB(rBGqG)2  RG)]
o
:
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Since 
 = 0, we have B = v(r
B
GqG)  clB(rBGqG)2  RG and simplify the objective function
further:

n
G[v(rGqG)  clG(rGqG)2  RG] + BB
o
: (B6)
The entrepreneur maximizes her payo¤ in (B6); subject to B = v(r
B
GqG) clB(rBGqG)2 RG;
RG   ckGq2G  0; (B2); (B3) and (B4). It is clear that, for any  < 1; the outcome from
this problem gives a strictly lower payo¤ to the entrepreneur than the one with 
 > 0 (for
 = 1, the outcome of the problem is the same as the one with 
 > 0).
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